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PREFACE 
This publication is prepared under a collaborative research 
project concerning rural finance in the Philippines. The prin-
cipal collaborating institutions are the Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies (PIDS), the Agricultural Credit Policy 
Council (ACPC), and the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI). OSU participation is funded by the USAID Mission in the 
Philippines and the Bureau of Science and Technology, AID, 
Washington. The views expressed in these publications are those 
of the authors and may not be shared by any of the collaborating 
or sponsoring institutions. In particular, the views in this 
paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the 
ACPC. 
A complete list of publications produced by OSU for this 
project is provided at the end of this paper. 
RURAL CREDIT POLICY: DO WE NEED TO TARGET? 
by 
GILBERTO M. LLANTO* 
The proainence given to credit targeting as a critical 
approach to increase the productivity and well-being of specific 
sectors of the econoay is exeaplified by a recent proposal in 
the Philippines to establish a "tobacco planters' bank" in order 
"to help tobacco faraers in their financing 
needs." The proposal draws strength froa the traditional view 
that credit is a vital coaponent of a strategy to increase 
output and enhance the welfare of econoaic agents involved and 
aust, therefore, be directed or channeled to a particular 
*Dr. Llanto is the Deputy Executive Director of the Agricul-
tural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) and currently teaches at the 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila Univer-
sity. He obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from the School of 
Economics, University of the Philippines in 1987 with monetary 
and international economics as his fields of specialization. 
This paper was first published in August, 1987, by ACPC 
under the saae title. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the comments and sugges-
tions of Dr. R. Meyer and Dr. V.B. J. Tolentino. 
purpose or sector, i.e. targeted!/ and, if possible, given at 
concessionary rates. 
Proponents of this view argue that credit targeting will 
bring about a higher level of productivity in the rural sector 
because cheap agricultural credit to pre-identified groups and/or 
specific commodities will encourage faraers to use modern 
inputs, avail themselves of •odern technology and make productive 
investments. The ultimate pay-off will come in terms of in-
creased output, expansion of the growth potential of the rural 
economy and, more importantly, an increase in farmers' incomes. 
This credit philosophy is also thought capable of offsetting 
the penalty impact on the rural sector of macroeconomic policies 
like overvalued exchange rates, price controls and taxes on 
agricultural output. These policies introduce distortions in 
factor and goods markets and create adverse efficiency and equity 
effects. One way, therefore, to try to offset this negative 
impact is through credit targeting. 
Such is the popular view. 
This article argues that (a) loan or credit targeting does 
not work, (b) the government, which has no comparative advantage 
in the lending business, should stay out of it~ and (c) the 
government should, however, create the appropriate economic and 
11 This paper assumes that credit targeting invariably requires 
payment of concessionary interest rates by borrowers. 
Credit targeting and subsidized credit, therefore, are used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
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financial environment to induce gr~ater bank l~nding to the 
rural economy. 
This paper is divided into five (5} s~ctions: Section 1 
gives a brief review of the Philippine experience with loan 
targeting; Section 2 describes the present orientation of rural 
cr~dit policy; Section 3 discusses recent d~v~lopm~nts in rural 
financial markets, and Section 4 deals with a systems approach 
to the problem of raising rural output and farmers' 
Section 5 provides concluding observations. 
I 
incomes. 
The Philippine Experience with Cr~dit Targeting 
The Philippine experience with credit targeting gives some 
interesting lessons in terms of the effect of cheap credit on 
agricultural output, farmer incomes and resource mobilization in 
th~ rural areas. There are also some spill-over effects of the 
massive infusion of cheap credit on domestic liquidity and the 
balance of payments. 
Targeted loans became relatively more pronounced and 
substantial in 1973 with the advent of the gov~rnment's rice 
self-sufficiency program popularly known as Masagana-99. Cheap 
credit was combined with fertilizer subsidies and extension 
services to attain self-sufficiency in rice and generate an 
exportable surplus. 
Using about 6,000 technicians, millions of pesos, huge 
fertilizer subsidies, price supports and irrigation, M-99 was the 
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most ambitious production program ever implemented in the 
Philippines (Sacay, Agabin and Tanchoco, 1985). The food targets 
were attained. For the period 1973-1979, the additional output 
of palay was 5.3 million metric tons equivalent in volume to 
about 3.2 million metric tons of rice£/ (TBAC, 1981). 
However, the program's cost to the government was stagger-
ing. For the 1973-1980 crop year, Sacay, et. al. (1985) es-
timated the total cost borne by the government to be as much as 
P2.1 billion (Table 1). 
While the rice production target may have been achieved, if 
not exceeded by a large margin, still the program has to be 
reexamined in thP light of attendant costs. In particular, there 
seems to be some evidence that the credit subsidy had a low pay 
off and that the production goals would have been achieved anyway 
even in the absence of a massive infusion of cheap credit (Sacay 
et. al. 1985). On the other hand, there is also some evidence 
that the fertilizer subsidy, the extension services and the 
availability of modern technology would have sufficed for the 
attainment of the food production target. 
If the credit subsidy had a low pay off, then it makes no 
sense to extend cheap credit which becomes a budgetary problem 
for the government. It is better under such circumstances to 
~/ The reported success of the M-99 was disputed by Herdt and 
Gonzalez (1981) who argued that the 5.3 percent growth in 
rice production during the period of M-99 was not sig-
nificantly different from the growth rate observed prior to 
the program. 
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Table 1. Estimated Cost of Masagana 99, 
Item 
Credit Subsidy 
Market Price Subsidy 
Fertilizer Subsidy 
Extension Services 
Total 
Crop Year 1973-1980 
AMount 
(Million Pesos) 
903 
733 
366 
69 
2,071 
Source: Sacay, Agabin and Tanchoco (1985) 
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Percent 
of Total 
43.6 
35.4 
17.7 
3.3 
100.0 
spend the aoney for fertilizer, extension services and technology 
transfer. 
On the other hand, a cheap credit policy could yield 
unintended results. One of the unintended results was the 
estimated incidence of the subsidies granted through this 
program. Esguerra (1981) showed that the subsidies were largely 
captured by formal lenders and not by the intended target group, 
the farmer borrowers. Other evidence pointed to benefits 
accruing to the supply dealers, rice traders and consumers with 
the notable exception of farmer-borrowers (Saeay et. al. 1985). 
The equity impact of subsidized credit programs, therefore, is 
less than desirable. Neri and Llanto {1985) found that low-in-
come farmers who availed theaselves of 73 percent of the total 
number of loans, enjoyed only 32 percent of the total amount of 
subsidized loans granted. On the other hand, the high income 
farmers who accounted for 27 percent of the total nuab~r .of 
subsidized loans granted, took 68 percent of the total amount of 
subsidized loans granted. In effect, there was a real income 
transfer to high income farmers from small income farmers. 
The credit subsidy did not reach the intended borrowers -
the small farmers - and thus, "it will still be the more viable 
and bigger farmers who will gain access to it and retain credit 
lines" (Lamberte and Lim, 1987). Loans represent claims on 
resources and this access to cheap credit gives the bigger 
farmers additional command over resources. Since cheap money 
winds up in their hands, subsidies become very concentrated 
(Gonzales-Vega, 1977), and this worsens rural income distribu-
tion. 
The government used the supervised credit scheme to promote 
the M-99 program and the other supervised credit programs which 
mushroomed thereafter. Under this scheme, low-interest and 
collateral-free loans for production were channeled through the 
rural banks and the Philippine National Bank. The loanable funds 
were obtained from special time deposits of the government and 
through the rediscount window of the Central Bank of the Philip-
pines. The encouragement of the government and the natural 
instinct for making profits out of cheap money induced a wide 
usage of these funds by rural banks. 
These sources of funds created serious and negative spill-
over effects on the development of rural financial markets. The 
convenient access to cheap money inhibited real financial 
intermediation in the rural economy. Savings mobilization was 
neglected as rural banks obtained more than half of their 
loanable funds from special time deposits and rediscounts with 
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the Central Bank of the Philippines (Neri and Llanto, 1985). 
There was no d~termin~d effort to mobilize savings because 
r~discount money was cheap money. The rural banks in effect 
becaae aere channels of government credit, and there •ere limited 
opportunities to perform real banking functioDs, such as 
diversification of portfolios, spreading of risk, and financial 
intermediation. 
Since loan portfolios were not judiciously managed, aany 
rural banks eventually found theaselves saddled with high 
arrearages. Tol~ntino (l987a) noted th~ rapid deterioration of 
the quality of loan portfolios. Prior to the M-99 program, past 
due loans were only about 11 percent of the rural banking 
system's loan portfolio. By 1984 this proportion had increased 
to one-third. Rural banks' arrearages to the Central Bank of the 
Philippines increas~d to 72 p~rcent in 1984 froa 28 percent in 
1972. This weakened the formal rural financial system and 
further hampered the growth of the rural financial aark~ts. 
On the part of farmer-borrowers, loan targeting caused an 
excess demand for the cheap institutional credit. The result was 
~redit rationing as banks becaae very selective in granting 
loans. Thus, only tbe bigger farmers who were bankable and had 
collateral and other assets, were able to tak~ advantage of the 
cheap institutional credit. This "crowding out effect" drove 
small farmers to the informal credit •ark~ts, the only available 
source of credit for the•. 
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Thus, loan targeting, subsidized credit and credit quotas 
sponsored by government brought perverse effects. Lending to 
specified target groups did not allow the diversification of 
risks and denied crP.dit to non-farm enterprises (Meyer, 1979). 
The growth of rural financial markets lagged behind (Floro, 1987) 
while the equity objective was waylaid.1/ 
A little-mentioned although equally important aspect of 
cheap credit funded through the rediscounting window of the 
Central Bank concerns its implications for domestic monetary 
expansion and the balance of payments. Liberal rediscounting 
causes domestic monetary expansion. Maximizing economic agents 
respond by disposing of excess cash balances and shifting 
towards holding more real assets and foreign money. This 
creates tremendous pressure against the stock of international 
reserves (Llanto, 1987). The experience in Costa Rica, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1950s showed that liberal redis-
counting of agricultural loan paper caused corresponding foreign 
exchange reserve movements (Takagi, 1986). 
In support of spP.r.ial credit programs like M-99 the 
Central Bank of the Philippines allowed rediscounting of numerous 
agrirultural loan papers (Table 2). This had an immediate 
impact on domestic liquidity. The ratio of outstanding redis-
11 It is instructive to note that similar credit programs in 
other developing countries have also failed. Osuntogun and 
Oludimu (1981) observed that for over forty years, the 
government of Nigeria has been making efforts to provide 
credit facilities to small and medium-scale farmers. Such 
efforts have not been able to meet more than a !lax per-
centage of the credit requirements of the peasant farmers. 
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counts to domestic liquidity averaged 9 pereent from 1949-1972. 
But when special credit programs mushroomed during the period 
1973-1982, the average ratio of outstanding rediscounts went up 
to 13 percent, an increase of 44.4 percent over the average of 
the previously-cited period (Lamberte and Lim, 1987). This 
contributed in an important manner to the excess liquidity 
problem of the country during th~ early part of the 1980s and 
correspondingly to balance of payments pressure. 
II. 
Present Orientation of Philippine Rural Credit Policy 
Financial reforms were introduced in the recent period 
(1980-1987) to arrest the decline of the rural financial system 
(see Meyer, 1987; Tolentino, 1987; Graham, 1987). A uniform and 
market-oriented rediscount rate was adopted in place of the 
selective and subsidized credit policy. This is part of the 
deregulation of the financial system which removed lending and 
deposit interest rate ceilings and phased out the issuance of 
Central Bank bills. More recently, a rehabilitation package for 
rural banks was announced by the Monetary Board of the Central 
Bank of the Philippines, and a Comprehensive Agricultural Loan 
Fund (CALF) was created by Executive Order 113 which merged 
seventeen out of the thirty-nine separate commodity loan funds. 
The rehabilitation program avoids the writing off and 
liquidation-approach but instead presents an opportunity to 
ailing rural banks to reschedule their outstanding indebtedness 
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with the Central Bank of the Philippines and to strengthen their 
capital base by infusing f~esh private capital. The most 
noteworthy feature of the program is the infusion of new 
additional p~ivate capital which is the "ticket" for joining the 
program. This represents a form of commitment by the rural 
banks' stockholders to rationalize banking operations and 
management. A rural bank which has "bought the ticket" could 
either (a) opt for an equity conversion of its supervised 
rediscount fund arrearages and work out a repayment plan with the 
Central Bank of the Philippines/Land Bank of the Philippines, as 
the case may be, or (b) enter into a plan of payment directly 
with the Central Bank on an equal monthly amortization schedule. 
(See Graham, 1987 and CB Circular 1143 dated April 24, 1987, for 
details). The participants in the rehabilitation program would 
then be allowed access to the rediscount window. 
The creation of the CALF consolidated the different special 
credit programs of the Department of Agriculture into a single 
fund which was converted into a guarantee fund. It indicates the 
government's realization of the futility of targeting credit to 
specific commodities/end-users and engaging in direct lending 
activities. Under the guarantee scheme, a maximum of 85 percent 
of the default risks of bank lending to agricultural projects is 
assumed by the CALF. It is expected that this risk-sharing 
strategy will attract private banks to lend to agricultural 
projects. Government from then on will not be involved in the 
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lending business which is the area of comparative advantage of 
financial institutions. 
The CALF guarantee is operated through the three existing 
guarantee facilities of the government: (a) the Philippine Crop 
Insurance Corporation (PCIC), (b) the Quedan Guarantee Fund Board 
(QGFB) and (c) the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enter-
prises (GFSME). 
The PCIC provides insurance coverage for rice and corn which 
can perhaps be expanded later on to include certain vegetables. 
The QGFB operates the quedan system of guarantees for loans based 
on warehouse receipts or guedans of grain stocks. Traders and 
millers borrow from banks on the basis of these guedans. The 
GFSME extends guarantee cover for agricultural loans made by 
commercial and private development banks. 
In sum, the present rural credit policy relies on the 
market to bring about the efficient allocation of resources in 
the countryside. It recognizes that government has no compara-
tive advantage in managing credit programs. The economy's goal 
of attaining increased rural output and farmer income is better 
served by creating an economic and financial environment that 
provides the rural sector enhanced opportunity to develop and 
participate in the fruits of development.!/ 
~/ Section 4 discusses the point aore fully. 
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III 
Recent Developments in Rural Financial Markets in the Philippines 
We discuss here only three of the recent welcome develop-
ments in rural financial markets: (a) emphasis on rural resource 
mobilization, (b) attempts to link informal productive groups 
with banks and (c) moves to develop a secondary market system for 
agricultural loan papers. 
Rural Resource Mobilization 
Savings mobilization in the rural areas has today gained a 
respectable endorsement from policymakers and bankers alike. The 
traditional assumption that the rural areas cannot save and will, 
therefore, not be induced to save is now being challenged. Rural 
banks that lost the cheap rediscount facility have now realized 
that to stay in business they will have to perform real financial 
intermediation, and mobilizing deposits has no substitute in 
building a loanable fund base. 
The Agricultural Credit Policy Council is at the forefront 
of the campaign to mobilize rural savings through its Rural 
Savings Mobilization Project, a joint action-research project 
undertaken with the Ohio State University. This project will 
identify the different savings modalities in the rural areas, 
determine the significant factors in rural household saving, and 
recommend the appropriate policy response. 
This study will complement the effort to rehabilitate the 
rural banking system. The rehabilitation will produce a more 
efficient and dynamic rural banking system which will not act as 
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a aere conduit of government funds but will, among others. 
interaediate financial resources in the rural areas. 
Linking Informal Self-Help Groups with Banks 
The rationalization of rural credit policy has triggered 
some concern over the fate of small farmer-borrowers who are 
perceived to be generally unbankable. This mode of thinking 
believes that without loan targeting and concessionary interest 
rate these saall farmer-borrowers do not stand a chance vis-a-vis 
the loan applicants with collateral, proven record and managerial 
expertise. 
The fear is unfounded. The present market-orientation of 
rural credit policy has been introduced so that factor prices 
will reflect their true scarcity value which leads to their more 
efficient utilization. Together with this orientation is a 
totally new perception of the agricultural sector generally and 
faraing in particular. The new perception considers agricultural 
activities as a legitimate economic and business activity and not 
simply as a source of inexpensive food for urban consuaers and 
cheap raw materJals for doaestic industry and export. In the 
past, the goal was increased production. Today it is growth in 
production and profitability to farmers. 
To make farming profitable the government has pursued 
reforms in several fronts: the dismantling of the sugar and 
coconut monopolies, removal of export taxes on agricultural 
products except logs, liberalizing fertilizer importation, 
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lifting the copra export ban and reducing the role of the 
National Food Authority in wheat, flour and other feed imports 
(Meyer, 1987). Certainly, there are other areas of reform but 
the first decisive steps have been undertaken. 
On another front, the current effort to improve access to 
banking services of the informal sector can not be underes-
timated. In the rural areas various self-help groups (SHGs) 
which are informal, grassroots organizations, have been formed to 
address group-specific problems. The SHGs include many small 
farmers as their members; they are engaged in productive 
economic activities and perform regular lending and saving 
functions for their members. Their loan fund is generated from 
th~ deposit mobilization efforts of members and other internally 
generated resources. 
The promotion of linkages between banking institutions and 
SHGs will improve the access of small farmers and the low-income 
groups to banking services. In the Philippines, this promotion 
of linkages is spearheaded by the Philippine Council for Rural 
Savings and Finance (PCRSF), an umbrella non-government organi-
zation organized in October 1986 to promote savings-based 
financial system via self-help groups in the rural financial 
market, with the assistance of the Agricultural Credit Policy 
Council through technical and consultation services.~/ 
~/ See Gilberta M. Llanto, "Report on the Asia and Pacific 
Regional Agricultural Credit Association Regional Experts 
Consultation on the Survey of Self-Help Groups", Agricul-
tural Credit Policy Council August 4, 1987. 
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Two of the many possible linkage models are ~hown in Figures 
1 and 2. The linkag~s will ~ncourage savings mobilization among 
meabers of SHGs because these resources can be utilized by them 
as some sort of guarantee fund against which they can borrow from 
banks. Previously, non-bankable farmers who save and pool their 
savings for deposit in the banks will now be able to avail 
themselves of institutional resources. In short, the savings of 
SHGs will constitute the collateral and/or credit guarantees 
needed by banks. 
In the dirert linkage model (Figure 1), the SHG coordinates 
with governaent agencies (like the Land Bank of the Philippines), 
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for technical services 
and assistance, and with donor agencies also for seed fund 
purposes. and mobilizes members' savings for deposit in the 
banks. The SHG obtains credit which it can on-lend to its 
members. The group savings become a collateral and/or guarantee 
fund. 
The indirect linkage model (Figure 2) differs only with the 
earlier aodel because of the presence of a self-help proaotion 
institution (like the PCRSF) which acts as the direct link of 
member-SHGs with the government agencies, NGOs and donors on the 
one hand and with the banks, on the other hand~/. This lnstltu-
tion acts as a broker for SHGs. The legal personality and status 
of the self-help promotion institution enables it to deal with 
~/ Other models were presented in the Experts Consultation 
Meeting on Self-help Groups. Jogjakarta, Indonesia, July 28-
30, 1987. 
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in~titutions like banks which may require legal personality as a 
pre-condition for doing business with an entity. 
Towards a Secondary Market for Agri Loan Papers 
The Guarantee Funrt for Small and M~dium Enterprises (GFSME) 
is currently proposing the design and implementation of a 
secondary market system (SMS) for short, medium and long-term 
agricultural loans originated under the Guarantee Fund for Small 
and Medium Enterprises (GFSME), Quedan Guarantee Fund Board 
(QGFB), anrt the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC). 
This is a response to the shift in the government's rural credit 
policy from rtirect, subsidized lending to a guarantee-type of 
operation. The SMS will allow the trading of agricultural loan 
portfolios among banks and other financial institutions. The 
liquidation of the loan portfolios carried by the three guarantee 
institutions will create the liquidity needed by the rural 
sector, and allow savers and investors to position funds ad-
vantageously. It will encourage investors to maximize the 
purchase of agricultural loan papers because they would not be 
"locked in" since they can at anytime change the composition of 
their asset portfolios. Risk can be minimized by using the CALF 
as "buyer of last resort", especially during periorts of tight 
liquidity. This strengthens investor confjdence and the via-
bility of the SMS. 
The government's participation in the SMS through the CALF 
in providing guarantee cover and acting as "buyer of last resort" 
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will iaerease farm credit with out going to direct l~aai~~ 
prog~aas which strain the budget. 
On the other kanrl, the commercial banks who are •illi~g to 
lend to agriculture. but hesitate to do so because of perceived 
liquidity and interest rate ri~ks (Llanto, 1986), ~~ld f~n~ the 
SMS a convenient outl~t of excess bank liquidity. Rural penetra-
tion and coverage of the rural banking system is unparalleled 
(Tolentino, l987b) while commercial banks are currently a•ash 
with investiDle funds. It is here where the SMS would m&tter 
when commercial banks buy agricultural loan papers whicD are 
originated by rural banks and provided guarantee cover by CALF. 
Rural banks can concentrate on the retail si~e of ruPal lending 
in view of their familiarity with the various auaRees ~~ agri-
cultural lending; commercial banks and the g~a~ant•• iastitttttons 
can play the secondary market. 
IV 
A Systems ARproach t0 Rwval Development 
The new orientation of r~~a} cFe~it ~ol~ey ~akes 1he 
position that credit, much less targebed o~ subsidize' credit. is 
not the critical element in raising farm input and farmer income. 
There is some consensus about this proposition. In fact, some 
authors believe that the cheapness of inatitutiGnal c~~lit is of 
little interest to the borrowers - muck more important is the 
economic opportunity associated wit~ the USP of some ext~a 
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capital (Adera, l987)and that the critical elements are those 
that will renuce price~ of fertilizer anri other inputs, and raise 
producer prices (Tolentino, l987h) 
Crenit therefore i~ only an instrument whose effectiveness 
dPpends on the economic and financial policies and programs that 
go with it. Supply-leaning finance does not necessarily bring 
about increased productivity and greater farmer welfare, although 
certainly in its subsidized form excess riemand for it arises. On 
the contrary, there is ample evidence that farmers respond 
positively to realistic farm-gate prices while competitive prices 
of fertilizer, seeds and other inputs increase ~fficiency in 
production and brings higher net returns to farming. 
The systems approach views the problem of rural development 
as a general equilibrium problem where everything "hangs to-
gether". It recognizes the complexity of interaction and 
interface between and among technology, resources, infrastruc-
ture, markets and other support systems, information and at-
titude. Viewing the components of this package in isolation 
only leads to "waste, inefficiencies and confusion" (Padmanabhan, 
1982). 
In this respect the Department nf Agricultur~ maintains that 
the best way to assure the economy of food sufficiency, increased 
rural output and inflow of foreign exchang~ from agricultural 
exports is to make agriculture profitable. But to make it 
profitable means making a system approach operational in agri 
culture. Credit is easy to dispense; it does not take too much 
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imagination and, above all, it can be used to further some 
political aims. Making credit count and exposing its true nature 
and function is a more difficult undertaking. FortunateJy, the 
Department of Agriculture assigns it a secondary role in attain-
ing the agricultural sector's growth and equity objectives. 
v 
Conclusion 
The present orientation of rural credit policy brings a new 
era to Philippine rural finance. The experiment with loan 
targeting and subsidized credit was costly; its accomplishments 
with respect to the desired goal of increasing rural output and 
raising farmer income is op~n to question. 
The present rural credit policy is complemented by recent 
developments in rural financial markets. But most important of 
all is the growing realization and consensus that the proble• of 
rural development is a general equilibriu• pr~blea and is better 
addressed by a systems approach. 
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Table 2 
Agricultural Credit Programs Fundert 
throngh the Rediscount Window 
Year 
Program Implemented 
Masagana-99 1973 
Cotton Financing 1974 
Program 
CB-MECS Supervised 1974 
Experienced Edu-
cation Program 
Gulayan sa Kalusugan 1975 
Bakahang Barangay 
a. FattP-ning 
b. Cow/Calf 
Biyayang Dagat 
1978 
1981 
1979 
Orchard Crops 1982 
Maisagana 1982 
Pukyutang Barangay 1982 
Kalabaw ng Barangay 1983 
Rertiscount 
Rate 
3.0% (of w/c 
2% is rebat-
ablea/ 
3.0% c/ 
1.0%b/ 
3.0%c/ 
3.0%c/ 
3.0%c/ 
3.0%c/ 
Prescribed 
I.ending Rate 
not exceeding 12%d/ 
not exceeding 12%d/ 
not exceeding 12%d/ 
not exceeding 12%d/ 
10.0% + 2 service 
e/ charge 
12.0%f/ 
10.0% + 3.0% service 
chargeg/ 
15.0%h/ 
15.0%h/ 
15.0%h/ 
15.0%h/ 
a/ Later decreased to 1.0% in May 1974 (MCRB 74-24), then increased 
to 3.0% in February 1981 (CB Circular No. 784), then pegged to the 
Manila Reference Rate in March 1984 (CB Circular No. 994). 
b/ Later increased to 3.0% in February 1981 (CB Circ. No. 784), then 
pegged to the MRR in March 1984 (CB Circ. No. 994). 
c/ Later pegged to the MRR in March 1984 (CB Circ. No. 994). 
d/ Later specified to be 10% basic rate and 2% service charge in 
January 1977 (MCRRBSSLA 77-4), then 10% basic rate and 3% service 
charge in May 1978 (CB Circ. No. 610), then 12% inclusive of 
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service charg~ in S~pt~mb~r 1980 (CB Circ. No. 750}, then 15~ 
inclusive of 3% service charg~ in May 1982 (CB Circ. No. 930} 
then pegg~d to the MRR in March 1984 (CB Cire. No. 994) and 
eventually lift~d in Novemb~r 1985 (CB Circ. 1086) 
e/ Later, s~rvic~ charge increased to 3% in May 1978 (CB Circ. No. 
610), then 12% inclusive of service charge in Septeaber 1980 (CB 
Circ. No. 750), then 15% inclusive of 3% service charge in May 
1982 (CB Circ. No. 930), then pegged to the MRR in March 1984 (CB 
Circ. No. 994), and eventually lift~d in Novemb~r 1985 (CB Circ. 
No. 1986). 
f/ Later, increased to 15% in May 1982 (CB Circ. No. 930), then 
pegged to the MRR in March 1984 (CB Circ. No. 994), and eventually 
lifted in November 1985 (CB Circ. 1086). 
g/ Later decreased to 12.0% in Septeaber 1980 (CB Circ. No. 750}, 
then increased to 15% in May 1982 (CB Circ. No. 930), then pegged 
to the MRR in March 1984 (CB Circ. 994), and eventually lifted in 
November 1985 (CB Circ. No. 1086). 
h/ Later, pegged to the MRR in March 1984 (CB Circ. 994), and 
eventually lifted in November 1985 (CB Circ. 1086). 
Source: Various CB Circulators 
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